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ABSTRACT – Cloud computing is a model for enabling service user’s ubiquitous, 
convenient and on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources. Cloud computing is a promising technology to facilitate development of 
large-scale, on-demand, flexible computing infrastructures. But without security 
embedded into innovative technology that supports cloud computing, businesses are 
setting themselves up for a fall. The trend of frequently adopting this technology by the 
organizations automatically introduced new risk on top of existing risk. Obviously 
putting everything into a single box i.e. into the cloud will only make it easier for 
hacker. This paper presents an overview and the study of the cloud computing. Also 
include the several security and challenging issues, emerging application and the 
future trends of cloud computing. 
Keywords- Cloud Computing, Security treats, Cloud service user, 
Cloud service provider 
INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling service user’s ubiquitous, convenient and on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services), that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. Cloud 
computing enables cloud services. 
The security architecture and functions highly depend on the reference architecture, and 
this paper shows the reference architecture and the main security issues concerning this 
architecture. 
  Vol. 05 No. 02 2015 
p-ISSN 2202-2821 e-ISSN 1839-6518 (Australian ISSN Agency) 82800502201503 
 
www.irj.iars.info  Page 3 
COMPONENTS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
As shown in the Figure 1, key functions of a cloud management system is divided into 
four layers, respectively the Resources & Network Layer, Services Layer, Access Layer, 
and User Layer. Each layer includes a set of functions: 
The Resources & Network Layer manages the physical and virtual resources. 
The Services Layer includes the main categories of cloud services, namely, NaaS, IaaS, 
PaaS, SaaS/CaaS, the service orchestration function and the cloud operational function. 
The Access Layer includes API termination function, and Inter-Cloud peering and 
federation function. 
The User Layer includes End-user function, Partner function and Administration 
function. 
Other functions like Management, Security & Privacy, etc. are considered as cross-layer 
functions that covers all the layers. The main principle of this architecture is that all these 
layers are supposed to be optional. This means that a cloud provider who wants to use the 
reference architecture may select and implement only a subset of these layers. 
However, from the security perspective, the principal of separation requires each layer to 
take charge of certain responsibilities. In event the security controls of one layer are by 
passed (e.g. access layer), other security functions could compensate and thus should be 
implemented either in other layers or as cross-layer functions. 
THREATS FOR CLOUD SERVICE USERS 
RESPONSIBILITY AMBIGUITY 
Cloud service users consume delivered resources through service models. The customer-
built IT system thus relies on the services. The lack of a clear definition of responsibility 
among cloud service users and Providers may evoke conceptual conflicts. Moreover, any 
contractual inconsistency of provided services could induce anomaly, or incidents. 
However the problem of which entity is the data controller which on is the data processor 
stays open at an international scale (even if the international aspect is reduced to a 
minimal third party outside of the specific region like EU). 
LOSS OF GOVERNANCE 
For an enterprise, migrating a part of its own IT system to a cloud infrastructure implies 
to partially give control to the cloud service providers. This loss of governance depends 
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on the cloud service models. For instance, IaaS only delegates hardware and network 
management to the provider, while SaaS also delegates OS, application, and service 
integration in order to provide a turnkey service to the cloud service user. 
LOSS OF TRUST 
It is sometime difficult for a cloud service user to recognize his provider’s trust level due 
to the black-box feature of the cloud service. There is no measure how to get and share 
the provider’s security level in formalized manner. Furthermore, the cloud service users 
have no abilities to evaluate security implementation level achieved by the provider. Such 
a lack of sharing security level in view of cloud service provider will become a serious 
security threat in use of cloud services for cloud service users. 
SERVICE PROVIDER LOCK-IN 
A consequence of the loss of governance could be a lack of freedom regarding how to 
replace a cloud provider by another. This could be the case if a cloud provider relies on 
non-standard hypervisors or virtual machine image format and does not provide tools to 
convert virtual machines to a standardized format. 
UNSECURE CLOUD SERVICE USER ACCESS 
As most of the resource deliveries are through remote connection, non -protected APIs, 
(mostly management APIs and PaaS services is one of the easiest attack vector). Attack 
methods such as phishing, fraud, and exploitation of software vulnerabilities still achieve 
results. Credentials and passwords are often reused, which amplifies the impact of such 
attacks. Cloud solutions add a new threat to the landscape. If an attacker gains access to 
your credentials, they can eavesdrop on your activities and transactions, manipulate data, 
return falsified information, and redirect your clients to illegitimate sites. Your account or 
service instances may become a new base for the attacker. From here, they may leverage 
the power of your reputation to launch subsequent attacks. 
LACK OF INFORMATION/ASSET MANAGEMENT 
When applying to use Cloud Computing Services, the cloud service user will have 
serious concerns on lack of information/asset management by cloud service providers 
such as location of sensitive asset/information, lack of physical control for data storage, 
reliability of data backup (data retention issues), countermeasures for BCP and Disaster 
Recovery and so on. Furthermore, the cloud service users also have important concerns 
on exposure of data to foreign government and on compliance with privacy law such as 
EU data protection directive. 
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DATA LOSS AND LEAKAGE 
The loss of encryption key or privileged access code will bring serious problems to the 
cloud service users. Accordingly, lack of cryptographic management information such as 
encryption keys, authentication codes and access privilege will heavily lead sensitive 
damages on data loss and unexpected leakage to outside. For example, insufficient 
authentication, authorization, and audit (AAA) controls; inconsistent use of encryption 
and/or authentication keys; operational failures; disposal problems; jurisdiction and 
political issues; data center reliability; and disaster recovery can be recognized as major 
behaviors in this threat category. 
THREATS FOR CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS 
RESPONSIBILITY AMBIGUITY 
Different user roles, such as cloud service provider, cloud service user, client IT admin, 
data owner, may be defined and used in a cloud system. Ambiguity of such user roles and 
responsibilities definition related to data ownership, access control, infrastructure 
maintenance, etc, may induce business or legal dissention 
PROTECTION INCONSISTENCY 
Due to the decentralized architecture of a cloud infrastructure, its protection mechanisms 
are likely to be inconsistency among distributed security modules. For example, an access 
denied by one IAM module may be granted by another. This threat may be profited by a 
potential attacker which compromises both the confidentiality and integrity. 
EVOLUTIONAL RISKS 
One conceptual improvement of cloud computing is to postpone some choices from the 
design phase to the execution phase. This means, some dependent software components 
of a system may be selected and implemented when the system executes. However, 
conventional risk assessment methodology can no longer match such an evolution. A 
system which is assessed as secure during the design phase may exploit vulnerabilities 
during its execution due to the newly implemented software components. 
BUSINESS DISCONTINUITY 
The “as a service” feature of cloud computing allocates resources and delivers them as a 
service. The whole cloud infrastructure together with its business workflows thus relies 
on a large set of services, ranging from hardware to application. However, the 
discontinuity of service delivery, such as black out or delay, may bring out a sev ere 
impact related to the availability. 
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SUPPLIER LOCK-IN 
The platform of a service provider is built by some software and hardware components 
by suppliers. Some supplier-dependent modules or workflows are implemented for 
integration or functionality extension. However, due to the lack of standard APIs, the 
portability to migrate to another supplier is not obvious. The consequence of provider 
locked-in could be a lack of freedom regarding how to replace a supplier. 
LICENSE RISKS 
Software licenses are usually based on the number of installations, or the numbers of 
users. Since created virtual machines will be used only a few times, the provider may 
have to acquire from more licenses than really needed at a given time. The lack of a 
“clouded” license management scheme which allows to pay only for used licenses may 
cause software use conflicts. 
BYLAW CONFLICT 
Depending on the bylaw of hosting country, data may be protected by different applicable 
jurisdiction. For instance, the USA Patriot Act may authorize such seizures. EU protects 
cloud service user's private data, which should not be processed in countries that do not 
provide a sufficient level of protection guarantees. An international cloud service 
provider may commit bylaws of its local datacenters which is a legal threat to be taken 
into account. 
BAD INTEGRATION 
Migrating to the cloud implies moving large amounts of data and major configuration 
changes (e.g., network addressing). Migration of a part of an IT infrastructure to an 
external cloud service provider requires profound changes in the infrastructure design 
(e.g. network and security policies). A bad integration caused by incompatible interfaces 
or inconsistent policy enforcement may evoke both functional and non - functional 
impacts. 
UNSECURE ADMINISTRATION API 
The administration middleware standing between the cloud infrastructure and the cloud 
service user may be not sure with insufficient attention devoted to sanitation of cloud 
service user inputs and authentication. Non-protected APIs, mostly administration APIs 
becomes a target of choice for attackers. This is not specific to cloud environment. 
However, the service-oriented approach makes APIs a basic building block for a cloud 
infrastructure. Their protection becomes a main concern of the cloud security. 
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SHARED ENVIRONMENT 
Cloud resources are virtualized, different cloud service users (possibly competitors) share 
the same infrastructure. One key concern is related to architecture compartmentalization, 
resource isolation, and data segregation. Any unauthorized and violent access to cloud 
service user's sensitive data may compromise both the integrity and confidentiality. 
HYPERVISOR ISOLATION FAILURE 
The hypervisor technology is considered as the basis of cloud infrastructure. Multiple 
virtual machines co-hosted on one physical server share both CPU and memory resources 
which are virtualized by the hypervisor. This threat covers the failure of mechanisms 
isolating attack” could be launched on a hypervisor to gain illegal access to other virtual 
machines’ memory. 
SERVICE UNAVAILABILITY 
Availability is not specific to cloud environment. However, because of the service - 
oriented design principle, service delivery may be impacted while the cloud infrastructure 
in not available. Moreover, the dynamic dependency of cloud computing offers much 
more possibilities for an attacker. A typical Denial of Service attack on one service may 
clog the whole cloud system. 
DATA UNRELIABILITY 
Data protection includes access to data for the confidentiality as well as its integrity. 
Cloud service users have concerns about how providers handle with their data, and 
whether their data is disclosed or illegally altered. Even if the cloud service user trust is 
not in the central of cloud security, it is a major marketing differentiator for a cloud 
service provider to advance the migration of IT system to cloud environment. 
ABUSE RIGHT OF CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDER 
For a cloud service user, migrating a part of its own IT to a cloud infrastructure implies to 
partially give control to the provider. This becomes a serious threat to cloud service user's 
data, notably regarding role and privileges assignment to providers. Coupled with lack of 
transparency regarding cloud provider practices may conduce mis-configuration or 
malicious insider attack. Such security breaches will lower the provider’s reputation, 
resulting in lower cloud service user confidence. 
ISSUES IN CLOUD 
Security is the most important issue in cloud computing. We are residing everything in 
providers premises which makes the information highly unsecured [6]. It’s a main 
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obstacle in adoption of cloud computing. According to the IDC’s survey on the cloud 
services, security concerns are number one issue facing cloud computing [7][8]. IDC’s 
findings in the survey of 224 IT executives are shown in fig.2. 
Difficulties or overheads in front of cloud computing are the danger of-Disrupts Services, 
Theft of Information, Loss of Privacy, Damage of information. These problems prevent 
the organizations to adopt the cloud computing services. These can be removed by 
applying highly trusted security protocols. IEEEtran.bst files, whereas the Microsoft 
Word templates are self-contained. Causal Productions has used its best efforts to ensure 
that the templates have the same appearance. 
SECURITY CONCERN 
Heightened security threats must be overcome in order to benefit fully from this new 
computing paradigm. Some security concerns are listed and discussed below: 
1. Security concern #1: Company has violated the law (risk of data seizure by 
(foreign) government). 
2. Security concern #2: Storage services provided by one cloud vendor may be 
incompatible with another vendor’s services if user decides to move from one to 
the other (e.g. Microsoft cloud is incompatible with Google cloud). [9] 
3. Security concern #3: Who controls the encryption/decryption keys? Logically it 
should be the customer. 
4. Security concern #4: Ensuring the integrity of the data (transfer, storage, and 
retrieval) really means that it changes only in response to authorized transactions. 
A common standard to ensure data integrity does not yet exist. 
5. Security concern #5: Some government regulations have strict limits on what data 
about its citizens can be stored and for how long, and some banking regulators 
require that customer’s financial data remain in their home country. 
6. Security concern #6: Customers may be able to sue cloud service providers if their 
privacy rights are violated, and in any case the cloud service providers may face 
damage to their reputation. Concerns arise when it is not clear to individuals why 
their personal information is requested or how it will be used or passed on to other 
parties. 
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7. Security concern #7: With the cloud model control physical security is lost 
because of sharing computing resources with other companies. No knowledge or 
control of where the resources run. 
8. Security concern #8: The dynamic and fluid nature of virtual machines will make 
it difficult to maintain the consistency of security and ensure the audit ability of 
records. 
9. Security concern #9: In case of Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
(PCI DSS) data logs must be provided to security managers and regulators. 
[10][11[12] 
10. Security concern #10: Users must keep up to date with application improvements 
to be sure they are protected. 
CONCLUSION 
In any cloud service (infrastructure, software or platform) the end service provider or 
enterprise will control the access to the services. If these services are being hosted on the 
cloud, then the cloud provider (which may be different from the service provider or 
enterprise) also needs to protect their network from unauthorized accesses. However, 
since the cloud provider and the service provider or enterprise is legally different entities, 
they may in certain cases need to isolate their respective user information. 
In this paper, we provide Cloud Security treats in terms of Cloud Service user and 
provider. Based on these Cloud Security treats, the following items are main topic for 
Cloud Security standardization: 
 Security Architecture/Model and Framework 
 Security Management and Audit Technology 
 Business Continuity Planning (BCP) and Disaster Recovery 
 Storage Security 
 Data and Privacy Protection 
 Account/Identity Management 
 Network Monitoring and Incident Response 
 Security Management 
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 Interoperability and Portability Security 
 Virtualization Security 
 Obligatory Predicates 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The Cloud Computing Components 
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Figure 2: Analysis of major issues of Cloud Computing 
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